Social drivers forewarn of marine regime shifts by Hicks, Christina et al.
1 
 





Christina C. Hicks1,2,3*, Larry B. Crowder1,4, Nicholas A. J. Graham2,3, John N. Kittinger1,5, 6 





1Center for Ocean Solutions, Stanford University, Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, 12 
Monterey, CA 93940, USA *(christina.c.hicks@gmail.com) 13 
2ARC Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University, Townsville, Qld 14 
4811, Australia 15 
3Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YQ, UK 16 
4Hopkins Marine Station, Stanford University, Pacific Grove, CA 93950, USA 17 












Some ecosystems can undergo regime shifts to alternative compositions of species. While 28 
ecological indicators can identify approaching regime shifts, we propose that rapid changes 29 
in the social drivers underlying ecosystem change may provide additional and potentially 30 
earlier indicators of impending shifts. We demonstrate this by reconstructing the 31 
underlying social drivers of four iconic marine regime shifts: Pacific kelp forests, NW 32 
Atlantic continental shelf, Jamaican coral reefs, and the Chesapeake Bay estuary. In all 33 
cases, a range of social drivers, including opening of lucrative markets, technological 34 
innovations, and policies that enhanced the driver, ultimately drove ecosystem shifts. 35 
Drawing on examples emerging from environmental management practice, we present 36 
three tangible recommendations for using social drivers as early indicators: monitor social 37 
change, identify social trigger points, and identify policy responses. In doing so we argue 38 
that accounting for the underlying social drivers of ecosystem change could improve 39 





In a nutshell: 43 
 44 
• Ecosystems can undergo dramatic shifts in their composition due to increasing human pressure  45 
• Identifying indicators of these shifts before they occur is key to early management intervention 46 
• The underlying social factors that escalate human pressures may be useful early indicators of 47 
ecosystem shifts 48 
• We use four well known marine ecosystem shifts to investigate this hypothesis 49 
• We suggest social monitoring programs, actionable social trigger points, and policy responses 50 
that target incentives can help identify and manage the social factors responsible for ecosystem 51 
shifts 52 
 53 
Regime shifts and drivers of change 54 
 55 
Many ecosystems can undergo dramatic and relatively persistent changes in their species 56 
assemblages, termed regime shifts (WebPanel 1) (Scheffer et al. 2012). Following a regime shift, 57 
the services provided by the ecosystem are likely to have changed, with potential ramifications 58 
for the societies that depend on them (Graham et al. 2013). It may require considerable 59 
management effort to reverse regime shifts, if at all possible. 60 
 61 
Much of the literature on regime shifts has focused on identifying direct, or proximate, drivers, 62 
such as fishing, pollution or land clearing, and relating the magnitude of those drivers to the 63 
changing ecosystem state (Geist and Lambin 2002). At low levels, a proximate driver such as 64 
fishing, may have little effect on the ecosystem. As the driver increases, however, the 65 
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ecosystem’s resilience, or its ability to withstand change, weakens. Pulse perturbation events, 66 
which may be natural or anthropogenic in origin, can precipitate a regime shift, particularly when 67 
interacting with chronic drivers, for example changes in grazing pressure (Holmgren & Scheffer 68 
2001; Mumby et al. 2007) (Figure 1a). In theory, chronic proximate drivers can also reduce 69 
resilience to the point where the ecosystem can transition to an alternative state without a pulse 70 
perturbation (Figure 1a). In order to reverse regime shifts, some systems will need drivers to be 71 
reduced below levels that caused the original shift; a phenomenon known as hysteresis. It is 72 
therefore widely recognized that regime shifts are easier to prevent than to reverse (Hughes et al. 73 
2013).  74 
 75 
Early warning indicators of regime shifts 76 
 77 
Natural resource management often only recognizes and responds to regime shifts at the point 78 
when a change is imminent, or once a change has already occurred (Kelly et al. 2015). However, 79 
anticipating when regime shifts are likely to occur is of great interest, as it offers potential for 80 
management to ameliorate impacts before a system passes a tipping point. As such, recent 81 
research has identified ecosystem behavior, such as rising variance of key system components, or 82 
slowing recovery rates post perturbation (Scheffer et al. 2012), which indicate a system is 83 
approaching a tipping point (Figure 1a). Other techniques, such as spatial correlation of 84 
ecosystem variables (e.g. dominant habitat cover) (Dakos et al. 2010), or successively 85 
incorporating new data into models as it is generated (Carpenter et al. 2014), may provide earlier 86 
opportunities for managers to intervene. However, in many ecosystems these signals are difficult 87 
to detect, partly due to insufficient data or long generation times of study organisms (Nyström et 88 
5 
 
al. 2008). In this review, we put forward the hypothesis that underlying social factors, that 89 
escalate proximate drivers, may provide additional early warning indicators of regime shifts, and 90 
thus inform management. 91 
 92 
Changes to the rate at which a tipping point is approached  93 
 94 
It is possible that a range of underlying social factors, often termed distal drivers, can influence 95 
the magnitude of a proximate driver, and thus the likelihood of a regime shift (Figure 2, 96 
WebPanel 2). Distal drivers can include new technologies, opening of markets, demographic 97 
changes, or changes in governance structures or policy (Lambin et al. 2001; Geist and Lambin 98 
2002; Kittinger et al. 2012). These distal drivers, working singly or in concert, can escalate the 99 
magnitude of a proximate driver, with consequent ecological outcomes (Brewer et al. 2012). For 100 
example, fishing (the proximate driver) may increase linearly through time, with the rate of 101 
increase among locations tied to a changing distal driver, such as human population growth 102 
(Mora et al. 2011) (slopes r1 and r2 on Figure 1b). Alternatively, the rate of change in fishing 103 
can increase, or decrease, dramatically in response to a new distal driver, such as a new 104 
technology enabling more efficient fishing (Squires and Vestergaard 2013), or connections to 105 
global markets increasing incentives to fish (Berkes et al. 2006, Cinner et al. 2013) (r3 in Figure 106 
1b). Despite the fact that distal drivers are major determinants of the extent of human impacts on 107 
ecosystems, these social factors are rarely addressed in either the science or management of 108 
ecosystems prone to regime shifts (Brewer et al. 2012).  109 
 110 




We identified the four most iconic examples (based on number of citations per year) of regime 113 
shifts in different coastal marine ecosystems (kelp forests, continental shelves, coral reefs, and 114 
estuaries) (Figure 3). We then drew from the historical literature on these case studies to assess 115 
how the magnitude of the proximate drivers of the regime shifts were influenced by underlying 116 
distal drivers.  117 
 118 
Northern Pacific sea otter loss causing kelp forest regime shifts  119 
 120 
One of the best known cases of predators driving ecological regime shifts, involves the northern 121 
sea otter (Estes et al. 1998). In the North Pacific, otter populations had been harvested by native 122 
hunters for thousands of years (Simenstad et al. 1978), but were driven close to extinction by 123 
commercial hunting in the 1800s, creating an explosion in urchin densities that diminished kelp 124 
forests and associated fish and invertebrates.  125 
 126 
Commercial hunting of sea otters was driven by a lucrative market for fashionable otter fur 127 
(Figure 3a). A Russian expedition - the St. Peter - discovered the sea otter in 1741 and began 128 
selling their furs in Kamchatka, Russia. In 1778, the British entered the sea otter trade when 129 
Captain Cook sailed to Nootka Sound (Vancouver Island). Americans, inspired by reports from 130 
Cook’s expeditions, entered the trade in 1792 (Fontenoy 1997). The British, and later the 131 
Americans, sold their furs in China for “nearly double the value” offered in Russia (Fontenoy 132 
1997). This profitable market accelerated exploitation; one trip aboard the Columbia in 1792 sold 133 
2000 otter furs for over $45 each, totaling a current value of over $1.2 million (Fontenoy 1997). 134 
As supply increased in the late 1790s, prices fell to about $20 per pelt, with the Americans 135 
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supplying an average of 35,000 pelts per year to the Chinese market by the early 1800s 136 
(Fontenoy 1997). 137 
 138 
Between 1817-1822, the US trade averaged 20,000 furs per year, falling to 2000-3000 per year in 139 
the 1830s, and by 1840 otters were depleted and trade plummeted. Trade resumed when America 140 
bought Alaska from Russia in 1867, and furs were selling for $100-165 per pelt [~$2,500-4,200 141 
in current dollars](McClung 1978). In 1903 a single sea otter pelt sold in London for the 142 
equivalent of $28,000 in current dollars (Gibson 1992). In 1911 some 30 schooners plied 143 
Alaskan waters for sea otters, capturing just 12 individuals (McClung 1978). The North Pacific 144 
Fur Seal Treaty, banning commercial seal hunting in an effort to preserve sea otter populations, 145 
was signed in the same year.  146 
 147 
Lucrative foreign markets represent the main distal driver that caused an escalation in the 148 
proximate driver - harvesting of sea otters - eventually resulting in the collapse of sea otter 149 
populations, an explosion in sea urchin densities, and the loss of kelp forest habitat. Although 150 
this market driven harvesting increased fairly gradually, it accelerated in pulses when new 151 
markets or countries entered the trade (Figure 4a), highlighting the importance, to environmental 152 
management, of monitoring markets. 153 
 154 
Canadian cod collapse causing continental shelf regime shift 155 
 156 
Canadian cod stocks have been fished for hundreds of years (Roberts 2007). However, in the 157 
mid-1980s to early 1990s fishing caused cod biomass in the northwest Atlantic to collapse, with 158 
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concomitant increases in prey species such as small pelagic fish and benthic invertebrates (Frank 159 
et al. 2005).  160 
 161 
Abundant cod stocks were discovered in the early 1500s (Roberts 2007), with dried and salted 162 
fish sold in Europe, the West Indies, and Brazil from the 1600s (Figure 3b, Kurlansky 1997). 163 
These markets were major drivers of exploitation rates; for example following the American War 164 
for Independence in the late 1700s, Nova Scotia gained a monopoly on the substantial British 165 
West Indies market, causing a boom in shipbuilding and an increase in cod exports from ~5000 166 
tons in 1789 to ~25,000 tons by 1806 (Lear 1998).  167 
 168 
The early fisheries were under sail power and principally used hook and line recording huge 169 
catches. In the mid-late 1800s, technological developments in the form of trawling by steam and 170 
diesel-powered vessels greatly intensified catch rates (Jackson et al. 2001). Landings declined 171 
briefly in the late 1800s due to a ~30% drop in export prices (Alexander 1974). However, 172 
exports grew steadily from 1898-1913 (Alexander 1974) and new domestic markets developed, 173 
including the sale of fresh fish, distributed by steam boats and the Intercolonial Railway (Lear 174 
1998). By the 1920s steam trawlers with on-board fish filleting and fast-freezing technologies 175 
further enhanced exploitation rates and export to foreign markets (Roberts 2007). The 1950s and 176 
60s saw rapid growth of distant water high capacity trawler fleets (Roberts 2007).  177 
 178 
A series of governance changes exacerbated the decline of Canada’s cod stocks. In 1977 an 179 
exclusive economic zone to 200 nautical miles was established, preventing other nations from 180 
fishing the banks. Consequently, Canada invested heavily in fishing fleets expecting substantial 181 
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returns. Fisheries scientists in the 1980’s, not having a long time series of unbiased scientific 182 
trawl data, based their models on catch per unit effort data from the fisheries. However, the 183 
introduction of new fish-finding technologies allowed fishers to maintain catches, despite the 184 
dwindling stock (Roberts 2007). Some scientists sounded alarm, but quotas were set far too high 185 
and the fishery collapse and associated ecosystem regime shift was already unfolding.  186 
 187 
Market, governance, and technological changes represent the main distal drivers that acted in 188 
combination to rapidly escalate the proximate driver – fishing – causing cod stock collapse and 189 
an associated increase in prey species abundance (Figure 4b). The succession of technological 190 
changes in particular played a key role in rapidly escalating fishing capacity, highlighting the 191 
importance of carefully regulating this critical distal driver (Squires and Vestergaard 2013).  192 
 193 
Coral to algal regime shifts in Jamaican coral reefs 194 
 195 
Jamaican coral reefs underwent a dramatic regime shift in the 1980s, with coral cover declining 196 
from 52% to 3% and macroalgal cover increasing from 4% to 92% (Hughes 1994). These 197 
changes are largely attributed to long-term overfishing of herbivores and land-based pollution 198 
which together enhanced algal overgrowth, diminishing the capacity of the reefs to recover from 199 
successive perturbations - most notably hurricane Allen in 1980, and a disease in 1983 that 200 
decimated herbivorous sea urchins (Hughes 1994, Lapointe 1997). 201 
 202 
Fishing and pollution were mediated by a number of distal drivers. Between AD 600 and 1500 203 
Jamaica’s population, dependent on agriculture and fishing for food, grew rapidly, reaching, by 204 
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some estimates, 1 million (Hardt et al. 2009). Between 1500 and 1650, turtles and manatees were 205 
hunted extensively, and pigs and cattle introduced to the land. However, disease brought by the 206 
Spanish reduced the Jamaican population to 5,000 (Hardt et al. 2009).  207 
 208 
During the British colonial period (1656-1852), changes to policy meant forested land was 209 
progressively converted to sugar, coffee, and banana plantations to serve foreign markets, with 210 
subsequent impacts to water quality (Higman 1987). Jamaica led global sugar production 211 
between 1700 and 1900, producing 100,000 tonnes at its peak in 1805. The Jamaican population 212 
grew, reaching 600,000 in 1891, due to the slaves imported to work sugar plantations (Watts 213 
1987). Cultivated land increased throughout the 1900s with diversification of crops, and 214 
accelerated land conversion for mining and urbanization. By 1980 the population was 2.2 million 215 
(see: https://www.quandl.com/MADDISON). The 20th century saw the birth and growth of a 216 
new market for tourism; visitor numbers growing from 100,000 in 1952 to 670,000 by 1981 217 
(Taylor 1993, Jamaica tourist board).  218 
 219 
Prior to 1900 fish consumption consisted mainly of imported salted cod, herring, and mackerel. 220 
In the early 1900s reef fish, caught using traps and longlines, were traded for salt fish (Hardt et 221 
al. 2009). Technological developments in the form of new spirit sails enabled fishers to fish 222 
further from shore, and chicken wire mesh allowed fishers to develop cheaper, larger, and more 223 
durable traps (Figure 3c, Munro et al. 1971). This growth in fishing prompted an official 224 
statement on the degraded nature of the fishery in 1945 (Hardt et al. 2009). However, policy 225 
through the 1970’s and 1980’s involved subsidies (e.g. for engines, fuel, and chicken wire) 226 




Rapid human population and market growth, coupled with technological and policy changes 229 
represent the main distal drivers that acted to intensify the two proximate drivers - fishing and 230 
pollution - ultimately resulting in the collapse of Jamaica’s coral reefs (Figure 4c). The 231 
complexity of multiple interactive drivers highlights the importance of a diverse monitoring 232 
portfolio and cross-sectoral co-operation. 233 
 234 
Benthic to pelagic regime shift of Chesapeake Bay 235 
 236 
The Chesapeake Bay estuary underwent a system wide regime shift in the 1950s from a clear 237 
water benthic estuarine ecosystem largely dominated by seagrasses and oyster reefs to one 238 
dominated by planktonic communities and altered food webs (Kemp et al. 2005). This regime 239 
shift is largely attributed to land-based pollution creating excessive nutrient input and 240 
overharvesting of filter-feeding oysters. 241 
 242 
Europeans settled in the Bay’s catchment in the 1600’s, and following an initial decline, human 243 
population grew exponentially (Curtin et al. 2001). Policy has meant the Bay watershed has 244 
served various land-uses causing changes in land-based pollution, sediment and nutrient impacts. 245 
During the 17th century, the Bay watershed was cleared for timber and agriculture (mainly 246 
tobacco fields); however, long fallow periods meant little sediment escaped the land (Brugger 247 
1988). Subsequent agricultural expansion for wheat, and crop rotation systems involved clearing 248 
less fertile areas with more erodible soils, (Kemp et al. 2005). By the 1900s, the human 249 
population in the Bay’s drainage area was 16 million (Kemp et al. 2005) and, exacerbated by 250 
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technological developments and increasingly mechanized farming practices, many tributaries to 251 
the Chesapeake were choked with sediments (Cronon 1983). In the 1900’s the Great Depression 252 
spurred the expansion of infrastructure through public works projects to repair and expand the 253 
region's roads, bridges, parks, and electrical services into rural areas, encouraging further 254 
population growth. Although expanding urban areas caused agricultural land use decline, 255 
technological improvements in the form of commercial fertilizers in the 1950s continued to 256 
accelerate nutrient loading in the bay (Brugger 1988). With, over half the bay’s marshes 257 
deteriorated, nutrient buffering capacity at the estuarine margins was reduced (Kearney et al. 258 
2002).  259 
 260 
Oysters, which are critical to Chesapeake Bay’s ecology, have been harvested since Europeans 261 
arrived in the 1600’s. A big change occurred in the late 1800s, when technological developments 262 
in the form of dredges escalated harvesting of oysters (Figure 3d) and, between 1890 and 1930, 263 
landings declined by two-thirds (Brooks 1981). Although harvests remained relatively stable 264 
between 1930 and 1950s, a pair of diseases decimated the remaining oyster populations (Kemp 265 
et al. 2005). While oyster populations could filter the Bay’s water in three to six days prior to the 266 
1870s, remaining populations in the 1980s would take 11 months (Newell 1988). 267 
 268 
In Chesapeake Bay, a combination of population growth, technological, and policy changes were 269 
the main distal drivers that exacerbated the two proximate drivers - land-based pollution and 270 





Interactions between distal drivers and ecosystem ecology 274 
Each of our case studies involves a different suite of distal and proximal drivers acting on 275 
distinct ecological species or processes. Perhaps the two simplest case studies are the otter and 276 
the cod examples, with harvesting, a proximate driver, causing population collapse of key 277 
species in the ecosystem. The collapse of otter populations was much faster than cod. 278 
Commercial otter loss occurred within 100 years of commercial harvesting, while cod collapse 279 
took about 500 years. The distal drivers of harvesting differed; an explosive export market for 280 
sea otter fur stimulated rapid harvest, while markets for salt cod, changes in regulatory policy, 281 
and technological innovations drove the overexploitation of cod. However, the effects of 282 
harvesting, and the rates at which the system collapsed, are also related to differences in the 283 
ecology. Sea otters are relatively long lived and have limited reproductive capacity, so the 284 
vulnerability of their populations to heavy exploitation is high. Otters were also behaviorally 285 
susceptible, due to the accessibility of foraging grounds. Conversely, cod were somewhat more 286 
robust to exploitation due to their faster life history (growth and reproductive potential), 287 
mobility, and complex population structure. Furthermore, cod inhabit a much more inaccessible 288 
environment, with the banks of the NW Atlantic causing challenges for fishers due to the dangers 289 
of the open ocean, and the technologies required to exploit resources from the sea bottom. In 290 
situations where a keystone species is being harvested, their ecology can alert managers as to the 291 
type and rate of distal driver to monitor.  292 
  293 
The Jamaican and Chesapeake Bay case studies are more complex, in that both involved two 294 
dominant proximate drivers; a reduction in water quality and harvesting of species that provide 295 
key ecosystem processes. The distal drivers differed somewhat, yet the impact on ecosystem 296 
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processes was quite similar. While reduced water quality favored algal or plankton proliferation, 297 
the capacity of ecosystem processes (by fish in Jamaica, and oysters in Chesapeake Bay) to 298 
respond was undermined by harvesting. These two case studies highlight the importance of 299 
understanding interactions among multiple distal and proximate drivers and key ecological 300 
processes leading to system collapse.  301 
 302 
Applied solutions to manage shifting social drivers 303 
 304 
Our review highlights how it is incumbent on managers and scientists to look deeper into the 305 
underlying social drivers of change to aid in anticipating undesirable regime shifts. However, the 306 
science and policy options to effectively incorporate distal drivers into early warning indicators 307 
and decisive action need to be carefully developed. Importantly, the root social drivers 308 
implicated in ecological shifts are often context specific, which will require managers to gain an 309 
understanding of the history of human-environmental interactions, and of the ecology of their 310 
system.   311 
 312 
From our review, we propose three primary ways in which distal drivers influence ecosystem 313 
condition, each with differing implications for detection and response. The first category is 314 
where a single distal driver acts continuously but at different rates in different locations (e.g. 315 
population growth). Although it may be difficult to recognize an impending shift, these slow 316 
drivers can provide managers with the time necessary to respond (Hughes et al. 2013). The 317 
second category is where multiple distal drivers act in combination to exacerbate change (e.g. 318 
population, economic growth, and land use change). In these instances, it is important for 319 
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scientists and managers to develop an understanding of the interacting and cumulative effects 320 
these drivers have, and target interventions appropriately. The final category includes distal 321 
drivers that can have pulse effects that rapidly escalate change (e.g. a new technology, a new 322 
rapidly developing market). These drivers are likely to be the easiest to detect due to the sudden 323 
nature of their appearance, and because they have a dramatic and rapid effect on the proximate 324 
driver. Effectively responding to social drivers will require management agencies to build 325 
interdisciplinary and social science capacity through training existing staff and securing funding 326 
for new social science specific positions. We recommend the following steps to incorporate 327 
distal drivers into early warning of regime shifts: 328 
 329 
Invest in social monitoring.  In addition to monitoring ecosystem responses to proximate 330 
drivers, there is a need to routinely monitor the distal social drivers that underlie change. 331 
Although data on some distal drivers may be difficult to collect, others are relatively 332 
straightforward, through interacting with relevant agencies (e.g. government bodies for 333 
population and economic growth rates), resource user groups (e.g. fishers organizations for 334 
technological changes), market, and social surveys (e.g. consumers for changing market 335 
preferences). Indeed, recent years have seen some government agencies responsible for marine 336 
systems implementing social monitoring programs, for example the US’s National Oceanic and 337 
Atmospheric Agency (Breslow et al. 2013). Key to the success of this work is the involvement of 338 
social scientists from the earliest stage possible, specifying what needs to be collected and 339 
identifying the most suitable approaches, scales, and timings to do so (Meyfroidt et al. 2013). To 340 
ensure the drivers that accelerate ecosystem change are captured, an agency’s environmental 341 
monitoring framework should at a minimum include all five categories of distal social driver 342 
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(demographic, technological, market, culture, and governance) (Figure 2). Such an approach 343 
should also allow for alternate distal drivers to be detected, if and where they exist.  344 
 345 
Specify social trigger points. To be effective, any monitoring program needs clear guidance on 346 
what information should trigger a response. These trigger points should be informed by 347 
hypothesized scenarios of how the system will change, can be based on the distal driver reaching 348 
a certain level, or the proximate driver responding in a specific way. For example, a trigger point 349 
level that may be suitable for a single distal driver acting continuously (e.g. population growth), 350 
may have to be adjusted when multiple distal drivers act in combination. For distal drivers that 351 
have a pulse effect (e.g. new technology), trigger points should be based on variation in the rate 352 
of change of the proximate driver.  353 
 354 
Identify policy responses. Each actionable trigger point needs to be associated with a suitable 355 
management or policy response. Typically, policy responses designed to influence social factors 356 
either attempt to control people (e.g. restricting access), or change their incentives. For example, 357 
markets are powerful drivers of overexploitation, but can also be used to shape behavior. Up to 358 
16% of the global marine fisheries catch is controlled by just 13 corporations, presenting the 359 
opportunity to influence a significant proportion of globally harvested marine products 360 
(Osterblom et al. 2015). Having reached a trigger point, and enacted a response, the social 361 
ecological system needs to be monitored and assessed against the expected outcomes to ensure 362 




Through monitoring social drivers, specifying social trigger points, and identifying policy 365 
responses, managers will be presented with a clear strategy for where action is possible; such as 366 
to regulate or close a market (e.g. for a specific species, as may have been appropriate for 367 
northern sea otters); ban or modify a technology (e.g. that spreads rapidly or impacts critical 368 
ecosystem processes, such as those in the Canadian cod or Chesapeake Bay oyster fisheries); and 369 
amend or lift a policy (e.g. that creates unexpected or perverse behaviors, such as those 370 
enhancing fishing in Jamaica). Operationalizing these ideas requires a broadening of the 371 
conventional purview of environmental management and increasing, or redirecting, resources. 372 
For example, an understanding of distal drivers is likely to benefit contemporary challenges such 373 
as fishery responses to the redistribution of fish stocks and community compositions due to 374 
ocean warming (Pinsky et al. 2013), enabling appropriate management responses.  Ultimately, a 375 
greater understanding of the causal pathways through which social drivers influence ecological 376 
outcomes, may endow managers and conservation practitioners with early warning signs with 377 
long lead times to anticipate ecosystem shifts, and effectively respond to the underlying social 378 
drivers of change, thus proactively avoiding the potential onset of major impacts to ecosystems 379 




This work was supported through the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (Ocean Tipping 384 
Points project), the Center for Ocean Solutions, and the Australian Research Council. The 385 
manuscript was improved through the comments of Joshua Cinner. Jerker Lokrantz and Cindy 386 
Huchery helped with figures. Many thanks to Valery Garrett for the photo in Figure 3a, the 387 
18 
 
Archives and Manuscripts Division of the QE II Library at Memorial University, Canada for 388 






Alexander D. 1974. Development and dependence in Newfoundland 1880-1970. Acadiensis 4: 3-393 
31. 394 
Allen CR, Garmestani AS. 2015. Adaptive management of social-ecological systems. New York, 395 
NY: Springer. 396 
Berkes F, Hughes TP, Steneck RS, et al. 2006. Globalization, roving bandits, and marines 397 
resources. Science 311: 1557-1558. 398 
Breslow S, Holland D, Levin P. 2013. Human dimensions of the CCIEA: A summary of 399 
concepts, methods, indicators, and assessments. Seattle, WA: NOAA. 400 
Brewer TD, Cinner JE, Fisher R, et al. 2012. Market access, population density, and 401 
socioeconomic development explain diversity and functional group biomass of coral reef fish 402 
assemblages. Global Environ Chang 22: 399-406. 403 
Brooks WK. 1891. The oyster. Baltimore, MD: JHU Press. 404 
Brugger RJ. 1988. Maryland: A middle temperament. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 405 
Press. 406 
Carpenter SR, Brock WA, Cole JJ, et al. 2014. A new approach for rapid detection of nearby 407 
thresholds in ecosystem time series. Oikos 123: 290-297. 408 
Cinner JE, Graham NAJ, Huchery C, et al. 2013. Global effects of local human population 409 
density and distance to markets on the condition of coral reef fisheries. Conserv Biol 27: 453-410 
458. 411 
Cronon W. 1983. Changes in the land: Indians, colonists, and the ecology of New England. New 412 
York, NY: Hill and Wang. 413 
Curtin PD, Brush GS and Fisher GW. 2001. Discovering the Chesapeake: The history of an 414 
ecosystem. Baltimore, MD: JHU Press. 415 
Dakos V, van Nes EH, Donangelo R, et al. 2010. Spatial correlation as leading indicator of 416 
catastrophic shifts. Theor Ecol 3: 163-174. 417 
Erlandson JM, Graham MH, Bourque BJ, et al. 2007. The kelp highway hypothesis: Marine 418 
ecology, the coastal migration theory, and the peopling of the americas. J Island Coast Archaeol 419 
2: 161-174. 420 
Estes JA, Tinker MT, Williams TM, et al. 1998. Killer whale predation on sea otters linking 421 
oceanic and nearshore ecosystems. Science 282: 473-476. 422 
Fontenoy PE. 1997. Ginseng, otter skins, and sandalwood: The conundrum of the China trade. 423 
Nth Mariner 7: 1-16. 424 
Frank KT, Petrie B, Choi JS, et al. 2005. Trophic cascades in a formerly cod-dominated 425 
ecosystem. Science 308: 1621-1623. 426 
20 
 
Garrett V. 2008. Chinese dress: From the Qing dynasty to the present. North Clarendon, VT: 427 
Tuttle Publishing. 428 
Geist HJ and Lambin EF. 2002. Proximate causes and underlying driving forces of tropical 429 
deforestation. Bioscience 52: 143-150. 430 
Gibson JR. 1992. Otter skins, boston ships and china goods. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 431 
University Press. 432 
Graham NAJ, Bellwood DR, Cinner JE, et al. 2013. Managing resilience to reverse phase shifts 433 
in coral reefs. Front Ecol Environ 11: 541-548. 434 
Hardt MJ. 2009. Lessons from the past: The collapse of Jamaican coral reefs. Fish Fish 10: 143-435 
158. 436 
Higman BW. 1987. The spatial economy of Jamaican sugar plantations: Cartographic evidence 437 
from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. J Hist Geog 13: 17-39. 438 
Holmgren M, Scheffer M. 2001. El Niño as a window of opportunity for the resilience of 439 
degraded arid ecosystems. Ecosystems 4: 151-159. 440 
Hughes TP, Linares C, Dakos V, et al. 2013. Living dangerously on borrowed time during slow, 441 
unrecognized regime shifts. Trends Ecol Evol 28: 149-155. 442 
Hughes TP. 1994. Catastrophes, phase-shifts, and large-scale degradation of a Caribbean coral-443 
reef. Science 265: 1547-1551. 444 
Jackson JBC, Kirby MX, Berger WH, et al. 2001. Historical overfishing and the recent collapse 445 
of coastal ecosystems. Science 293: 629-638. 446 
Kearney MS, Rogers AS, Townshend JR, et al. 2002. Landsat imagery shows decline of coastal 447 
marshes in Chesapeake and Delaware bays. EOS Trans Am Geophys Union 83: 173-178. 448 
Kelly RP, Erickson AL, Mease LA, et al. 2015. Embracing thresholds for better environmental 449 
management. Phil Trans R Soc B 370: 20130276. 450 
Kemp WM, Boynton WR, Adolf JE, et al. 2005. Eutrophication of chesapeake bay: Historical 451 
trends and ecological interactions. Mar Ecol Prog Ser 303: 1-29. 452 
Kittinger JN, Finkbeiner EM, Glazier EW, et al. 2012. Human dimensions of coral reef social-453 
ecological systems. Ecol Soc 17: 17. 454 
Kurlansky M. 1997. Cod: A biography of the fish that changed the world. Cod. New York, NY: 455 
Penguin Group. 456 
Lambin EF, Turner BL, Geist HJ, et al. 2001. The causes of land-use and land-cover change: 457 
Moving beyond the myths. Global Environ Chang 11: 261-269. 458 
Lapointe BE. 1997. Nutrient thresholds for eutrophication and macroalgal blooms on coral reefs 459 
in jamaica and southeast Florida. Limnol Oceanogr 42: 1119–1131. 460 
Lear WH. 1998. History of fisheries in the northwest Atlantic: The 500-year perspective. J 461 
Northwest Atl Fish Society 23: 41-73. 462 




Meyfroidt P, Lambin EF, Erb KH, et al. 2013. Globalization of land use: Distant drivers of land 465 
change and geographic displacement of land use. Curr Opin Env Sust 5: 438-444. 466 
Mora C, Aburto-Oropeza O, Ayala Bocos A, et al. 2011. Global human footprint on the linkage 467 
between biodiversity and ecosystem functioning in reef fishes. PLoS Biol 9: e1000606. 468 
Mumby PJ, Hastings A and Edwards HJ. 2007. Thresholds and the resilience of Caribbean coral 469 
reefs. Nature 450: 98-101. 470 
Munro JL, Reeson PH and Gaut VC. 1971. Dynamic factors affecting the performance of the 471 
antillean fish trap. Proc Gulf Caribb Fish Inst 23: 184–194. 472 
Newell RI. 1988. Ecological changes in Chesapeake Bay: Are they the result of overharvesting 473 
the american oyster, crassostrea virginica. Proceedings of the Conference Understanding the 474 
estuary: advances in Chesapeake Bay research; 29-31 March 1988; Baltimore, Maryland. 475 
Chesapeake Research Consortium Publication 129. 476 
Nyström M, Graham NAJ, Lokrantz J, et al. 2008. Capturing the cornerstones of coral reef 477 
resilience: Linking theory to practice. Coral Reefs 27: 795-809. 478 
Österblom H, Jouffray JB, Folke C, et al. 2015. Transnational corporations as 'keystone actors' in 479 
marine ecosystems. Plos One 10: e0127533 480 
Pinsky ML, Worm B, Fogarty MJ, et al. 2013. Marine taxa track local climate velocities. Science 481 
341: 1239-1242. 482 
Roberts C. 2007. The unnatural history of the sea: The past and future of humanity and fishing. 483 
Washington, DC: Island Press. 484 
Scheffer M, Carpenter SR, Lenton TM, et al. 2012. Anticipating critical transitions. Science 338: 485 
344-348. 486 
Simenstad CA, Estes JA and Kenyon KW. 1978. Aleuts, sea otters, and alternate stable-state 487 
communities. Science 200: 403-411. 488 
Squires D and Vestergaard N. 2013. Technical change in fisheries. Mar Policy 42: 286-292. 489 
Taylor FF. 1993. To hell with paradise: A history of the Jamaican tourism industry. Pittsburgh 490 
and London: University of Pittsburgh Press. 491 
Vickers D. 1996. The price of fish: A price index for cod, 1505-1892. Acadiensis 25: 92-104. 492 
Watts D. 1987. The West Indies: Patterns of development, culture and environmental change 493 




Figure captions 496 
 497 
Figure 1. (a) Heuristic model depicting the influence of a driver(s) on ecosystem state (usually 498 
described based on species composition and processes). In a two state system, the ecosystem, 499 
under the same magnitude of a given driver, may exist in one of two states (solid horizontal 500 
lines), separated by a threshold (dashed line). The upper solid blue dot is the forward tipping 501 
point from one state to the other, whereas the lower blue dot is the backward tipping point. The 502 
vertical arrows depict the rebound potential from acute disturbance events (e.g. hurricanes) that 503 
may displace the system. If the system is displaced across the threshold, it will transition to the 504 
other ecosystem state associated with reinforcing feedback mechanisms. Ecological early 505 
warning indicators (red arrowheads in top system state), indicate a regime shift is approaching, 506 
but typically are close to the tipping point. Based on evidence from four iconic marine ecosystem 507 
shifts, we show that underlying social factors predictably escalate the intensity of the proximate 508 
driver of change (yellow arrows in top ecosystem state), and thus may offer additional early 509 
indicators of regime shift risk. (b) The relationship between the intensity of proximate drivers 510 
and time, with rates of driver increase influenced by social changes. r1 and r2 could be the same 511 
proximate driver in different locations, where differences in the underlying social distal driver, 512 
such as population growth rates, create differences in the intensity of the proximate driver. The 513 
rate of change in the proximate driver can also show a dramatic change in response to distal 514 
socioeconomic change, for example a new fishing technology or new connections to global 515 




Figure 2. A heuristic framework describing the linkages between distal and proximate social 518 
drivers and marine ecosystems. Social systems, like ecosystems, exhibit hierarchical patterns of 519 
organization, with distal drivers directly mediating proximate drivers, which in turn affect 520 
ecosystem structure and function. Adapted from Geist and Lambin (2002) and Kittinger et al. 521 
(2012). 522 
 523 
Figure 3. Social drivers linked to iconic marine regime shifts. (a) Otter fur trimmed winter court 524 
gown from Qing Dynasty, China (Garrett 2008). Overharvesting of Pacific sea otters for these 525 
luxury fur markets caused regime shifts from kelp-dominated ecosystems to sea urchin barrens. 526 
(b) Salt cod drying in St John’s, Newfoundland, in the 1800s for export to international markets 527 
(Memorial University, Canada). Overfishing of NW Atlantic cod stocks escalated through 528 
various technological innovations, causing trophic cascades and the dominance of alternative 529 
species. (c) Small mesh chicken wire fish trap introduced to Jamaican coral reef fisheries (Jennie 530 
Franks). Overfishing and declines in water quality driven by land use change, subsidies and new 531 
technology, caused regime shifts from coral-dominated reefs to macroalgae-dominated reefs. (d) 532 
Oyster dredging enhanced harvest rates and ecosystem damage in Chesapeake Bay (Chesapeake 533 
Bay Program). Increasing nutrient loads and reductions in oyster populations due to land use 534 
change and a shift to dredging, caused a shift from a clear water benthic ecosystem state to a 535 
plankton dominated ecosystem state.  536 
 537 
Figure 4. Simplified timelines representing key changes in distal drivers contributing to regime 538 
shifts in four marine ecosystems. (a) North east Pacific kelp forests; (b) North west Atlantic 539 
continental shelf; (c) Jamaican coral reefs; and (d) Chesapeake Bay estuary. * Otter pelt price 540 
24 
 
converted to current day dollar values. ** Relative cod price index based on Spanish and US data 541 
(1505-1892) from Vickers (1996). 542 
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WebPanel 1. Glossary 543 
 544 
Distal Driver: the underlying factors that influence the magnitude of the proximate drivers that 545 
have a direct impact on the environment. 546 
Ecosystem Services: the range of benefits people gain from nature. 547 
Ecosystem State: a description of the composition, traits and functional attributes of an 548 
ecosystem. 549 
Hysteresis: the situation where the pathway of degradation differs from recovery, such that 550 
drivers of change need to be reduced beyond the original tipping point in order to reverse a 551 
regime shift. 552 
Open Access Resource: a situation where there are no restrictions on the groups of people that 553 
can extract a resource.  554 
Proximate Driver: the factors that have a direct impact on the environment. 555 
Regime Shift: substantial changes in the constituent species of an ecosystem, which may be 556 
persistent through time. 557 
Tipping Point: the point at which a system undergoes a transition from one regime to another. 558 
Threshold: points where a system can transition to an alternative regime. 559 
Trophic Cascades: predatory mediated changes to the abundance of prey populations through at 560 








WebPanel 2. Proximate and distal drivers of change  567 
Social systems, like ecosystems, exhibit hierarchical patterns of organization, with clear links 568 
between underlying social factors, and the proximate drivers that influence ecosystems (Geist 569 
and Lambin 2002, Kittinger et al. 2012). Proximate drivers are the human activities (such as 570 
fishing or pollution) that directly influence an ecosystem. Most research considers only this first 571 
interaction in the chain of causation. For example, assessments of the status or collapse of many 572 
marine fish stocks are usually based on catch rates as an indicator of fishing (Branch et al. 2010). 573 
Similarly, eutrophication of lakes, estuaries, or near-shore marine environments is usually linked 574 
directly to the input of nutrients and pollutants, as an indicator of agricultural land-use (Lunau et 575 
al. 2013). However, the magnitude of proximate drivers is determined by a range of distal factors 576 
(e.g. technologies, markets, population growth) (Geist and Lambin 2002). For example, 577 
technological developments such as fish finding equipment, opening of profitable markets, and 578 
policies such as subsidies can greatly influence catch rates in fisheries (Squires and Vestergaard 579 
2013). Similarly, land use policy such as urbanization, or subsidies that enhance fertilizer usage 580 
on farms, can substantially alter nutrient and chemical pollution of lakes and nearshore waters 581 
(Rabalais et al. 2009). There is a long tradition in the social sciences examining the relationship 582 
between distal and proximate drivers and their environmental outcomes (e.g., Lambin et al. 583 
2001; Geist and Lambin 2002), which can be drawn on to understand ecological regime shifts.  584 
 585 
By assessing the relationships between distal and proximate drivers, researchers and practitioners 586 
may develop a deeper understanding of the complex pathways influencing ecosystem change and 587 
ultimately the management actions that may avoid undesirable ecosystem regime shifts. 588 
Focusing only on the proximate drivers is akin to addressing the symptoms of illness, without 589 
27 
 
diagnosing and managing the root causes of a disease. Distal-proximate driver pathways of 590 
human mediated ecosystem degradation have been examined in some detail in a range of 591 
terrestrial ecosystems. For example Lambin et al. (2001) uncovered the complex social drivers 592 
and pathways that led to tropical deforestation. Governmental decisions to increase infrastructure 593 
(a distal driver) often increases access for both industries and migrants, leading to deforestation 594 
(Lambin et al. 2001). Identifying the key distal mechanisms causing escalating proximate drivers 595 
and ecosystem degradation enables policy to target the root cause of social-ecological system 596 
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